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Abstract 
 
When we see a stranger’s face, we quickly form impressions of his or her personality, and 
expectations of how the stranger might behave. Might these intuitive character judgments 
bias source monitoring? Subjects read headlines ‘reported’ by a trustworthy- and an 
untrustworthy-looking reporter. Subsequently, subjects recalled which reporter provided each 
headline. Source memory for likely-sounding headlines was most accurate when a 
trustworthy-looking reporter had provided the headlines. Conversely, source memory for 
unlikely-sounding headlines was most accurate when an untrustworthy-looking reporter had 
provided the headlines. This bias appeared to be driven by the use of decision criteria during 
retrieval rather than differences in memory encoding. Nevertheless, the bias was apparently 
unrelated to variations in subjective confidence. These results show for the first time that 
intuitive, stereotyped judgments of others’ appearance can bias memory attributions 
analogously to the biases that occur when people receive explicit information to distinguish 
sources. We suggest possible real-life consequences of these stereotype-driven source 
monitoring biases. 
  3 
Look who’s talking! Facial appearance can bias source monitoring 
Being able to accurately identify how we acquired a particular piece of information is 
important in many aspects of everyday life (Davis & Friedman, 2007; Sherman & Bessenoff, 
1999). One reason is that when we know from where information originated, we can assess 
its reliability (Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005): for instance, information learnt from a 
trusted friend is probably more likely to be accurate than is information learnt from a reputed 
liar. Unfortunately, though, our ability to match our memories to their sources is fallible. 
Because memories are not stored with convenient ‘labels’ indicating their origin, when we 
remember we engage in an attribution process known as source monitoring. That is, we infer 
the origin of information—correctly or incorrectly—by relying on additional source cues 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008).  
Most source monitoring research has focused on a single variety of source cue—the 
phenomenological qualities of memories, such as their perceptual vividness and 
cohesiveness. However, researchers have more recently explored how people use a second 
variety of cue—their background knowledge about different sources’ characteristics (Bayen, 
Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000). For example, Fragale and Heath’s (2004, Study 2) 
subjects read a story describing evidence pertaining to a murder investigation. Each piece of 
evidence incriminated one of two suspects, and was described as having been reported in 
either a newspaper or a gossip sheet. After subjects learnt which suspect was factually guilty, 
they recalled which evidence originated from each source. Subjects showed a bias toward 
attributing ‘correct’ evidence—which incriminated the guilty suspect—to the newspaper (the 
more reliable source), and ‘incorrect’ evidence to the gossip sheet (the less reliable source).  
In a similar way, our knowledge about social categories and characteristics, such as a 
person’s gender, sexual orientation, or occupation, can also bias source attributions (Cook, 
Marsh, & Hicks, 2003; Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). For 
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instance, in a study by Mather, Johnson and De Leonardis (1999), subjects saw video-clips of 
two speakers making political statements and subsequently received information that 
characterized each speaker as either Democrat or Republican. When subjects tried to recall 
who made particular statements, they were biased toward attributing statements matching a  
‘Democrat schema’ to the Democrat speaker, and statements matching a ‘Republican 
schema’ to the Republican speaker. 
However, in each of these studies, source information was given to subjects explicitly; 
that is, sources were labelled as either ‘newspaper’ or ‘gossip sheet,’ as either ‘Democrat’ or 
‘Republican,’ and so forth. In the present study, we ask whether people use attribution biases 
even when they receive no explicit information about sources’ characteristics. Specifically, 
we ask whether people’s intuitive character judgements—based on nothing but sources’ 
facial appearance—can guide their source monitoring. 
On the one hand, facial appearance could in principle be sufficient to elicit such an 
attribution bias. It is well known that people form strong and lasting impressions of others 
based solely on facial characteristics (for a recent review see Todorov, Said, Engell, & 
Oosterhof, 2008). When we see a stranger’s face, we automatically and almost 
instantaneously categorize them, not only by considering relatively unambiguous attributes 
such as sex and race (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & 
Ruderman, 1978), but also by inferring personality characteristics such as competence, 
likeability or trustworthiness (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren & Hall, 2005; Willis & Todorov, 
2006). These character judgements—though not necessarily accurate—guide people’s 
expectations and interpretations of others’ behaviour in many aspects of everyday life (Bull 
& Green, 1980; Bull & Hawkes, 1982; Hochberg & Galper, 1974). In short, the ubiquity and 
automaticity of facial stereotyping might lead one to expect that facial appearance would be 
sufficient to bias source monitoring. 
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On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that facial characteristics would 
not elicit attribution biases. First, attribution bias effects are mainly observed when the 
characteristics of different sources are highly salient (Davis & Friedman, 2007), whereas one 
might argue that with human faces, personality characteristics are inferred from rather subtle 
cues. Second, even with explicitly labelled, clearly distinct sources, pronounced effects are 
mostly found under poor memory-encoding or -retrieval conditions. For instance, biases are 
strongest among older adults (Mather et al., 1999), or when subjects experience high 
cognitive load during encoding or retrieval (Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Sherman & 
Bessenoff, 1999). Third, it has been shown that source attribution biases are most pronounced 
when information about the sources is available at retrieval but not during encoding (Cook et 
al., 2003; Hicks & Cockman, 2003). Clearly, this condition is not fulfilled if the source is 
represented by (a photograph of) a human face: Because facial stereotypes are formed almost 
instantaneously upon exposure (Willis & Todorov, 2006), any characteristics inferred from 
faces should be inferred during encoding, thus potentially minimizing any bias effects. 
The following experiment investigated this issue with respect to one specific facial 
cue—the perceived trustworthiness of sources’ faces. Subjects read fictional news headlines 
reported by a trustworthy-looking and an untrustworthy-looking reporter. After a short delay, 
they tried to recall which reporter provided each headline. We were primarily interested in 
whether people would tend to attribute likely headlines (i.e., whose outcome seems probable) 
to the more trustworthy-looking reporter, and unlikely headlines to the untrustworthy-looking 
reporter. Hereafter, we refer to this prediction as an inferential bias.  
However, people are influenced not only by what they rationally infer must be true, but 
also by what they would like to be true. Such ‘wishful thinking’ has been shown to produce 
source monitoring errors similar to those described above (Barber, Gordon, & Franklin, 2009; 
Gordon et al., 2005). Thus a secondary interest of the present study was to examine whether 
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facial trustworthiness would cue a wishful thinking bias, whereby subjects would tend to 
attribute desirable headlines (i.e., whose outcome is desirable) to the more trustworthy-
looking reporter, and undesirable headlines to the untrustworthy-looking reporter. If a wishful 
thinking bias were to occur, it might at least partly counter any inferential bias when 
likelihood and desirability are at odds (i.e., for likely-undesirable and unlikely-desirable 
headlines). Thus we also predicted a three-way interaction upon source accuracy between 
reporter’s appearance, headline likelihood, and headline desirability. 
Method 
Subjects & Design 
Forty undergraduates (53% female, MAge = 20.85, SD = 1.86, Range = 19-30) 
participated without payment. The study used a 2 (Reporter’s appearance: trustworthy vs. 
untrustworthy) x 2 (Headline likelihood: likely vs. unlikely) x 2 (Headline desirability: 
desirable vs. undesirable) repeated-measures design. 
Materials 
Face stimuli 
From the Essex Face Database (Spacek, n.d.) we selected 40 facial photographs of 
young Caucasian males without glasses, piercings or facial hair, in neutral expression and 
frontal view. Forty non-participating volunteers rated the trustworthiness of each face (1 = 
very untrustworthy; 7 = very trustworthy), amongst other traits (see General Discussion). We 
selected the four photographs with the highest mean trustworthiness ratings (combined M = 
4.78), and the four with the lowest mean ratings (combined M = 2.79) to use in the main 
study. We paired these eight photographs such that the members of each pair differed 
significantly in terms of trustworthiness (all ps < .001). Subjects in the main study were 
randomly assigned to see one of the four photograph-pairs. 
Headlines  
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We created forty 9- to 13-word fictional news headlines; ten for each of the four cells 
in our 2 (Likelihood) x 2 (Desirability) manipulation, and based on our own judgments of 
likelihood and desirability. As a manipulation check, the 40 non-participating volunteers 
rated the likelihood (1 = highly unlikely; 7 = highly likely) and desirability (1 = very 
undesirable; 7 = very desirable) of each headline-event. From each cell, we removed two 
headlines whose mean ratings were close to, or on the unexpected side of, the midpoint of 
either scale. The remaining likely headlines were judged as more likely than unlikely 
headlines (M = 4.64 vs. M = 2.50, p < .001), and desirable headlines were judged as more 
desirable than undesirable headlines (M = 5.69 vs. M = 1.58, p < .001). These 32 headlines 
were used in the main study, and examples are provided in Table 1. The full set of headlines 
is available from the authors. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Procedure 
We told subjects that they would read several headlines provided by two junior 
newspaper reporters. Subjects previewed the photographs of the two reporters they had been 
assigned: one trustworthy-looking, one untrustworthy-looking. Next, subjects were instructed 
to imagine they were the newspaper’s editor, and were told that they would later need to 
recall which reporter provided each headline. They saw a series of 32 slides on a computer 
screen, each comprising a headline on the right of the screen in 32-point font, and a large 
photograph of a reporter on the left. Each slide appeared for 10 s followed by a 1-s blank 
interval; the entire slide-sequence thus lasted just under 6 min. All subjects saw the same 
headlines in a randomized order. Subjects saw half of each headline-type (i.e., unlikely-
desirable; likely-undesirable, etc.) paired with a trustworthy-looking face, and half of each 
type paired with an untrustworthy-looking face; the headline/face-type pairings were 
counterbalanced across subjects.  
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Next, subjects completed an anagram-solving filler task for 10 min. Finally they 
received a questionnaire, on which all 32 headlines were listed in a single randomized order, 
and the appropriate two reporters were pictured at the top of each page. Subjects recorded 
which reporter they believed provided each headline, by ticking a box underneath the 
appropriate photograph and rating their confidence in each response (1 = Guess; 5 = Certain). 
Results and Discussion 
In determining which reporter provided each headline, our subjects performed at 74.2% 
accuracy on average (Range = 50-100%). To avoid ceiling effects in our analyses, we 
removed 9 subjects from analyses whose accuracy exceeded 90%; removing these data did 
not change the overall pattern of findings. 
Hereafter, we use the terms congruent and incongruent when referring to our 
experimental predictions, using a valence-based definition of congruence. That is, 
trustworthy faces are congruent with likely and desirable headlines, and untrustworthy faces 
are congruent with unlikely and undesirable headlines. 
Source Accuracy 
Data were analysed using a 2 (Reporter’s appearance) x 2 (Headline likelihood) x 2 
(Headline desirability) repeated-measures ANOVA on subjects’ source accuracy scores.  We 
found no main effects of headline likelihood, F(1,30) = 0.27, p = .87, ηp2 < .01, or headline 
desirability, F(1,30) = 0.05, p = .83, ηp2 < .001. However, the main effect of reporter’s 
appearance approached significance, F(1,30) = 3.48, p = .07, ηp2 = .10, showing that source 
accuracy was somewhat greater for trustworthy-looking than for untrustworthy-looking 
reporters’ headlines. 
Our primary question of interest was whether subjects used reporters’ facial appearance 
to cue an inferential bias. A significant two-way interaction between reporter’s appearance 
and headline likelihood was indeed observed, F(1,30) = 9.24, p < .01, ηp2 = .24: source 
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accuracy was greater when the headline’s likelihood was congruent rather than incongruent 
with the reporters’ facial trustworthiness. In contrast, the wishful thinking bias—that is, the 
interaction between reporter’s appearance and headline desirability—was not significant, 
although subjects’ accuracy scores tended in the predicted direction, F(1,30) = 2.52, p = .12, 
ηp
2 = .08: the source of headlines was recalled somewhat more accurately when their 
desirability was congruent rather than incongruent with the reporters’ facial trustworthiness. 
The interaction between headline likelihood and desirability was not significant, F(1,30) = 
0.13, p = .73, ηp2 < .01. 
However, the significant interactions were qualified by a marginally significant three-
way interaction, F(1,30) = 3.03, p = .09, ηp2 = .09. As Figure 1 illustrates, source attributions 
for likely-desirable headlines were strongly biased by reporter’s appearance (d = 1.25), 
whereas there was only a weak bias for all other headline types (largest d = 0.25). We return 
to consider this interaction in the General Discussion. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Signal Detection Analysis 
One possible mechanism underlying the observed inferential bias is that congruence 
between a reporter’s appearance and headline likelihood facilitated encoding of source 
information in memory. An alternative, but not mutually exclusive, possibility is that subjects 
used a decision strategy during retrieval to help them to determine the source of headlines. To 
differentiate between these two mechanisms, we conducted signal detection analyses on 
source accuracy scores. The analyses’ outcomes were highly similar regardless of whether we 
focused on accuracy for trustworthy- or for untrustworthy-looking reporters, thus here we 
arbitrarily report accuracy measures for the untrustworthy-looking reporters.  
We predicted—following Gordon et al. (2005)—that if subjects’ responses reflected 
differential encoding of congruent versus incongruent information, then there should be 
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differences in sensitivity (d’) between likely and unlikely scenarios. If subjects’ responses 
reflected a decision strategy at retrieval, then there should be differences in the criterion 
parameter (C). Following Gordon et al., we adjusted the proportions of hits and false alarms 
by converting X/N (where X = number of correct responses, and N = number of responses) to 
(X + 0.5)/(N + 1). This adjustment ensured that cells containing accuracy scores of 0% or 
100% did not produce infinite values for d’ or C. 
Comparing the mean signal detection parameters for likely and unlikely headlines, we 
found no significant differences in d’ (M = .89 vs. M = .94), t(30) = 0.30, p = .76, yet there 
were significant differences in C (M = .62 vs. M = .38), t(30) = 2.16, p = .04. In other words, 
subjects adopted a stricter criterion for attributing likely headlines than for attributing 
unlikely headlines to the untrustworthy-looking reporter. In line with the findings of other 
source monitoring studies (e.g., Cook et al., 2003; Gordon et al., 2005), these analyses 
suggest that the inferential bias was driven by decision-processes during retrieval, and not by 
differences in encoding. 
Confidence Ratings 
We finally asked whether subjects’ proneness to using this decision-based inferential 
bias was affected by their subjective confidence. It seems plausible that an inferential bias 
might only occur among specific subjects—for example, those who believe they have a poor 
memory for source information (general confidence). Alternatively, all subjects might use an 
inferential bias, but only when they are uncertain of the source of specific headlines (item-
specific confidence).  
First, with respect to general confidence, we calculated the mean confidence rating 
assigned by each subject across all 32 headlines. We then calculated the extent to which each 
subject demonstrated an inferential bias, by subtracting their mean source accuracy for 
likelihood-incongruent headlines from that for likelihood-congruent headlines. This measure 
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of bias did not correlate with subjects’ mean confidence ratings, r(29) = .01, p = .95; that is, 
there was no relationship between subjects’ general confidence and their tendency to use an 
inferential bias. 
Second, we found scant evidence that subjects’ item-specific confidence drove the 
inferential bias. A 2 (Reporter’s appearance) x 2 (Headline likelihood) x 2 (Headline 
desirability) repeated-measures ANOVA on subjects’ individual confidence ratings revealed 
no significant main effect of, nor interactions involving, reporter’s appearance, and no main 
effects of headline likelihood or desirability, all ps > .22, largest ηp2 = .05. There was, 
however, a marginally-significant interaction between headline likelihood and desirability, 
F(1,30) = 4.09, p = .052, ηp2 = .12. Surprisingly, headlines with congruent likelihood and 
desirability (i.e., likely-desirable or unlikely-undesirable) were attributed with less confidence 
than those with incongruent features. Indeed, the headlines that attracted the lowest 
confidence ratings were likely-desirable headlines—which were the ones that were most 
noticeably biased by reporters’ appearance (see Figure 1).  
Although this finding fits with the hypothesis that subjects used decision-biases when 
they had low confidence in the source of a specific headline, we are reluctant to conclude that 
it can explain our results. First, the magnitudes of the differences were small: just 0.19 scale-
points separated the headline-types with lowest and highest confidence ratings (Likely-
desirable headlines, M = 2.89, SD = 0.91; Likely-undesirable headlines, M = 3.08, SD = 
0.93). Second, aside from the lowest confidence ratings being attributed to the headline-type 
showing the greatest level of bias, there was no clear further relationship between these 
ratings and the level of bias observed. Third, and perhaps most importantly, when subjects 
made errors they were no less confident in their likelihood-congruent choices (M = 2.56) than 
their likelihood-incongruent choices (M = 2.50), p = .65. In sum, we conclude that differences 
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in subjects’ overall and item-specific confidence cannot adequately explain the observed 
inferential bias. 
General Discussion 
The present study shows that when people recall the source of verbal information, they 
use the facial characteristics of possible sources as a decision-cue. To our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical demonstration that facial appearance can inform and systematically bias 
source monitoring. Following studies which show that facial judgments are made 
automatically (Willis & Todorov, 2006), it is noteworthy that this bias occurred without 
subjects being instructed to form impressions of the reporters. 
Recall that our primary interest was in whether subjects would use reporters’ 
appearance to cue an inferential bias. Indeed, when our subjects saw likely-sounding 
headlines, they were more accurate at subsequently recalling who reported them if the actual 
source was trustworthy- rather than untrustworthy-looking. At the bias’s most prominent, 
subjects were almost 25% more likely to correctly identify the source of likely-desirable 
headlines when the reporter was trustworthy- than when he was untrustworthy-looking. Of 
course, in a human face—in contrast to artificially-constructed source information—
‘trustworthiness’ is not an isolated feature. People’s judgements of numerous valence-based 
personality traits are often intercorrelated (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), and indeed, our non-
participating volunteers’ trustworthiness ratings were strongly related to their ratings of 
attractiveness (r = .59) and intelligence (r = .77). One might speculate that the results 
observed in the present study reflect a general bias towards linking positive (likely, desirable) 
information with a positive-looking (trustworthy, attractive, intelligent) source, and negative 
information with a negative-looking source. Alternatively, one might argue that these results 
reflect a specific effect of perceived trustworthiness, independently of other correlated traits. 
Further work is needed to tease these alternatives apart.  
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 Overall, our findings fit with those of analogous studies that used explicit schematic 
information to differentiate sources (e.g., Fragale & Heath, 2004; Sherman & Bessenoff, 
1999), thus providing an initial demonstration that even implicit stereotypes based on 
intuitive judgments can bias source monitoring. Accordingly, we predict that facial 
appearance would cause even larger biases under poorer encoding and/or retrieval conditions. 
It is of particular interest that the inferential bias appeared to have no relationship with  
subjective confidence. In contrast, Hicks and Cockman (2003) found that decision-biases 
were most prominently associated with high confidence; yet our findings do at least concur 
insofar as they show that source biases are not necessarily—as one might predict—a product 
of low confidence. 
One thus far unexplained outcome of our study was that although subjects demonstrated 
a large attribution bias for likely-desirable headlines, the pattern was much less pronounced 
for other headline-types. Why would this be? As we predicted, the inferential bias could have 
been counteracted by an opposing wishful thinking bias in the cases of likely-undesirable and 
unlikely-desirable headlines. Yet this reasoning does not explain why we did not see larger 
biases in subjects’ attributions of undesirable-unlikely headlines. It is known that source 
monitoring of negatively-valenced information is often superior to that of positively-valenced 
information (Bell & Buchner, in press; Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2000), but even this 
phenomenon cannot account for our results, as subjects’ overall source accuracy was 
equivalent across all headline-types. This is not the first study to find larger attribution biases 
for positively- than for negatively-valenced information with equivalent overall source 
accuracy (e.g., Benney & Henkel, 2006); however, the mechanisms underlying this 
asymmetry and the circumstances under which it might occur are yet to be discovered.  
Beyond their theoretical implications for source monitoring and impression formation, 
the present findings also have practical implications. Davis and Friedman (2007), for 
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example, propose that remembering ‘who said what’ might often have repercussions, such as 
when a witness assists police by recalling who they heard make an incriminating statement. 
Guided by our results, it seems possible that in such a scenario, a witness might falsely 
attribute the statement to somebody with an untrustworthy, unattractive, or ‘criminal-looking’ 
face. Indeed, future research should explore the extent to which different facial 
characteristics, including criminality, influence source monitoring. Moreover, given that 
stereotype-driven thinking can induce distortions of memory (e.g., Kleider, Goldinger, & 
Knuycky, 2008; Ottati, Claypool, & Gingrich, 2005; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978), it seems 
possible that facial stereotypes could lead people to remember others doing things that never 
truly occurred. This is an important issue for future research to consider.  
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Table 1. Examples of headlines used in the main study. 
 Likely Unlikely 
Desirable “London Olympics investment will 
bring improvements in public 
transport in the capital” 
“80% of kids give up TV for 
exercise after successful educational 
campaign” 
Undesirable “Researchers admit that AIDS cure 
may still be many years away” 
“20% of UK prisoners to be released 
to make room in packed prisons” 
 
 
 Table 2. Main effects and interactions of experimental variables on subjects’ confidence ratings. 
Variable(s) F‐statistic  p‐value  Effect 
size (η2p) 
Reporter’s appearance  .48  .49  .02 
Headline likelihood  .23  .64  .01 
Headline desirability  .97  .33  .03 
Reporter’s appearance x headline likelihood  1.54  .22  .05 
Reporter’s appearance x headline desirability  .40  .53  .01 
Headline likelihood x headline desirability  4.09  .05  .12 
Reporter’s appearance x headline likelihood x 
headline desirability 
1.54  .22  .05 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Figure 1. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Source accuracy as a function of face trustworthiness, headline likelihood, and 
headline desirability, ±1SE. 
 
 
 
